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Youth-Led Anti-Corruption 
Movement in Post-Conflict 
Guatemala: ‘Weaving the Future’?*
Walter Flores1
Abstract This article examines youth-led anti-corruption protests in 
Guatemala in 2015, which contributed to the resignation of the president 
and vice-president. It outlines three key factors that were part of the initial 
success of the #RenunciaYa social media campaign, and the subsequent 
struggle towards political and structural reforms. First, it can be regarded as 
part of a much longer history of rights-led civic engagement and protest. 
Second, while social media proved indispensable for mobilising civic action, 
it was insufficient to reach beyond urban-based youth activists. Third, the 
removal of the president and vice-president was possible not only because of 
public pressure generated by anti-corruption youth activists, but also because 
of the longer-term work of two Attorney Generals and the International 
Commission Against Impunity in highlighting the fight against corruption 
within the national political agenda. Finally, the article argues that civic 
participation after conflict requires at least one generation to spring.
Keywords: anti-corruption, youth movements, post-conflict, 
Guatemala, social media, indigenous movements, social movements.
1 Introduction
This article examines the recent case of  youth-led anti-corruption 
protests in Guatemala in 2015, which resulted in the resignation of  the 
president and vice-president. Initially under the banner of  the hashtag 
#RenunciaYa, this social media campaign first galvanised protests in 
Guatemala City before spreading to the country’s other major urban 
centres. It culminated in a national strike on 27 August 2015, and the 
then president and vice-president of  Guatemala resigned in the face of  
public pressure and calls for their removal. In spite of  evolving from a 
campaign that targeted individual politicians (#RenunciaYa) to one that 
began to grapple with the breadth and depth of  corruption within state 
institutions (#JusticiaYa), momentum for systemic change proved difficult 
to sustain.
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This case study outlines three key factors that contributed both to the 
initial success of  the campaign, and to the subsequent struggle to push 
for broader political and structural reforms. 
First, it is necessary to understand the recent wave of  youth-led 
anti corruption movements in Guatemala as part of  a much longer 
history of  rights-led civic engagement and protest. This recent wave 
of  protests was borne out of  an initial period of  post-conflict political 
activism that was both distinct from, and nevertheless later connected 
to, the waves of  indigenous and peasant activism that defined 
Guatemala’s civil war period.
The youth leaders responsible for #RenunciaYa were born towards 
the very end of, or just after, the intensely violent civil conflict that 
embroiled Guatemala for over 30 years. These young leaders did not 
have direct experience with the types of  violent repression, sanction, 
and reprisal that were common outcomes for civic protest in their 
parents’ and grandparents’ generation. As a result of  this ‘generation 
gap’, as well as their initial failure to take into account long-standing 
indigenous and rural peasant movements, the youth-led anti-corruption 
movement was initially short-sighted in its quest for political change. 
Although indigenous and peasant movements participated in many of  
the protests initiated by the youth-led anti-corruption movement, their 
historical demands were not integrated into the #RenunciaYa agenda.
Second, while social media proved indispensable as a platform for 
communication to mobilise civic action, it was not sufficient to reach 
beyond urban-based youth activists. Ultimately, it was the interplay of  
social and traditional media that brought other groups – small business, 
indigenous rights organisations, and older generations – into the fold of  
the anti-corruption movement.
Third, the removal of  the president and vice-president was possible 
not only because of  public pressure generated by anti-corruption youth 
activists, but also because of  the longer-term work of  the Attorney 
General and the support of  the International Commission Against 
Impunity. This set of  actors helped to bring the fight against corruption 
front and centre in the national political agenda, communicating the 
results of  their investigations through frequent press conferences and 
traditional media outlets.
This case study explores these factors in turn and argues that the 
post-conflict period extends to a long time after the war ends. For the 
Guatemalan case, the protests occurred almost 20 years after the end of  
the war, in which a new post-conflict generation was able to undertake 
peaceful anti-corruption protests. In such contexts, it is necessary to 
bridge both generation gaps and civic demand ‘gaps’ to generate the 
necessary coalitions for judicial, electoral, and political reforms on the 
scale that Guatemala now requires.
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2 History of the conflict and aftermath in Guatemala
2.1 Period of conflict: 1960–962
From 1960 to 1996, Guatemala experienced one of  the most violent 
twentieth-century armed conflicts in the Americas. In a report published 
in 1999, Guatemala’s Historical Clarification Commission (Comisión de 
Esclarecimiento Histórico, or CEH) estimated that some 200,000 people 
had been either executed or disappeared, while the numbers of  orphaned 
children reached upwards of  150,000 (CEH 1999). The massacres 
and destruction of  rural villages gave rise to massive waves of  internal 
forced displacement and exile (Sanford 2004). During the period of  most 
intense conflict (1981–83) some 1.5 million Guatemalans were displaced. 
In total, one quarter of  all Guatemalans were directly impacted by 
political violence, whether in the form of  state-sanctioned assassinations, 
kidnappings, forced displacement, or disappearance (CEH 1999).
While the conflict’s original combatants were limited to members of  the 
Guatemalan military and several leftist guerrilla groups, under the umbrella 
of  Cold War politics, the conflict soon expanded to include labour unions, 
‘leftist’ intellectuals, human rights defenders, and unarmed indigenous 
populations accused of  supporting or sympathising with guerrilla groups 
(Grandin 2004). State repression targeted civil society leaders of  all stripes 
that appeared insufficiently ‘anti-communist’, as well as civic spaces 
considered rife with leftist thinkers (e.g. the national university). By the 
early 1980s, as part of  the state’s counter-insurgency strategy, arbitrary 
executions of  students and professors reached their peak and continued 
throughout the decade (Kobrak 1999). In the late 1980s, state-sanctioned 
killings shifted from targeting ‘leaders’ to targeting membership of  
grass-roots organisations as the government sought to destroy any perceived 
resistance from social and political organisations (CEH 2000).
Although the civil conflict impacted all age groups, much of  the 
violence and repression was aimed at those Guatemalans between 
16 and 45 years of  age (CEH 1999). In this sense, by attacking the 
nation’s youth, the heads of  young families, and adults in their prime, 
the repressive regime struck at the heart of  Guatemala’s human capital 
and severely hampered any potential for alternative forms of  leadership. 
The Guatemalan state inflicted violence and repression during this 
period both through legal channels and institutions, as well as through 
the use of  paramilitary and clandestine groups. Over the course of  
three decades of  conflict, these clandestine groups managed to embed 
themselves within, and co-opt structures of  the state (Insight Crime 2017). 
Ultimately, this co-optation created the grounds on which widespread 
corruption could take root. As described below, removing and fighting 
these clandestine structures, understood as organisations or groups who 
keep their affiliations and activities secret to avoid legal persecution, 
became part of  the peace agreement.
2.2 Peace Accords in the era of neoliberal policies
Following several years of  intense negotiation between the guerrilla 
movements and government, the Peace Accords were signed at the end 
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of  1996. These accords recognised the historical exclusion of  indigenous 
populations and included specific policies and targets related to public 
investment, accomplished via taxation reforms and other progressive 
policies (Cabanas 2008). Somewhat paradoxically, these progressive 
Peace Accords were secured at the same time that the Guatemalan state 
was aggressively implementing neoliberal policies, such as the signing 
of  the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Guatemala’s 
president at this time – Alvaro Arzú – who signed the Peace Accords 
represented the traditional economic elite. Beyond signing CAFTA 
and agreeing to structural adjustment reforms, Arzú went several steps 
further in the privatisation of  public assets, the enforced reduction of  
government salaries, and the termination of  15 per cent of  public sector 
contracts. Many public workers were offered yearly contracts without 
pension benefits. These policies resulted in increased unemployment and 
the concomitant expansion of  the informal economy. Not surprisingly, 
poverty indices and cost of  living increased. By the end of  the Arzú 
presidency in 1999, real-wage value had degraded to the point that it 
was equivalent to wage values in 1983 (Perla 2004).
However, while these neoliberal policies were put into place, the 
Peace Accords included specific targets for increased social spending, 
particularly in the health and education sectors. The Arzú government 
pursued these aims through social fund structures which rapidly became 
instruments of  political control and sites of  corruption. While spending 
increased via the social funds, the indicators for social development 
continued to lag far behind neighbouring Central American countries 
(Perla 2004). In sum, few of  the Peace Accords’ policies and structural 
reforms were implemented and indigenous populations continued 
to face social exclusion (Center for Economic and Social Rights and 
Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales 2009). As corruption 
within state structures and social funds grew, there was little outcry or 
civic action by non-indigenous groups. The fear of  reprisal engendered 
by three decades of  civil conflict had left its mark (Flores et al. 2009). 
While organised indigenous groups continued to mobilise on the 
long-standing issues of  land rights and war reparations, the majority of  
the non-indigenous urban middle class did not support these protests 
(Bastos and Brett 2010).
3 The rise of anti-corruption on the national agenda
Corruption has long been viewed as an intrinsic part of  the Guatemalan 
state (Andrés 2016). Beyond the violence and population displacement 
that defined the latter half  of  the twentieth century in Guatemala, there 
is a much longer history of  impunity for the country’s political and 
economic elites. However, this situation began to shift in 2015 when 
a very capable Attorney General, in collaboration with a UN panel 
of  investigators (the International Commission Against Impunity in 
Guatemala (CICIG in Spanish)), used a press conference to present 
evidence that the then vice-president was involved in a sophisticated 
ring that stole public resources in several custom ports. Everyone knew 
that corruption existed; however, they had never been presented with 
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all the details and evidence, leaving no space for doubt. The Attorney 
General’s team used modern investigative forensic techniques that 
showed the money trail and phone recordings between ring members 
that included the vice-president as one of  the leaders. The phone 
records and paper trails also involved the then president. The capacity 
to use such methods (new to the public) was provided by the CICIG.
The CICIG (the Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en 
Guatemala) had been formed in 2006 following the Peace Accords, 
in which an international independent panel of  experts was created 
to build the technical capacity of  the Public Prosecutor’s Office for 
investigation of  illegal groups using state institutions to commit crime 
(Weld 2016). In addition to the transfer of  knowledge and skills, the 
CICIG was also expected to support the public prosecutor in the 
litigation of  cases in the Guatemalan courts, recommend policy reforms 
that strengthened the judiciary system, and close legal loopholes. Most 
CICIG members are non-Guatemalan and have diplomatic immunity; 
the organisation itself  is funded by the international community (and 
not dependent on state funds). By the terms of  the Peace Accords and 
the creation of  CICIG, state representatives cannot interfere in these 
investigations or any other aspects of  the CICIG mandate.
The UN panel began its work in 2006. Although the CICIG 
investigated a range of  important cases, it did not initially tackle the 
mafia structures embedded in the state apparatus. This began to 
change in 2013, when a newly appointed Attorney General and the 
new Commissioner of  CICIG (a Colombian judge experienced in 
investigating paramilitary crime) teamed up to bring cases of  organised 
corruption that involved judges, congress members, the traditional 
economic oligarchy, and the elected president and vice-president. 
Through its work, the CICIG began to uncover the nested relationships 
of  corruption embedded within the Guatemalan state, which extended 
to all branches of  government and included members of  the economic 
elite that had bribed their way into political power.
The independent role of  the Attorney General was crucial for the 
investigation and uncovering of  cases of  institutional corruption. 
Although Thelma Aldana – General Prosecutor 2014–18 – played a 
key role in exposing corruption and laying the groundwork for the 2015 
anti-corruption protests, it was her predecessor – Claudia Paz y Paz 
(2010–14) who set the precedent for independent action. As Attorney 
General, Claudia Paz y Paz adopted the strategy of  setting performance 
targets to tackle corruption and inaction inside the Public Ministry. 
These targets provided the rationale for the removal of  those personnel 
not performing their public duties to a sufficient standard, and the 
hiring of  new, more committed, personnel (Sas 2011). Through the 
investigation process, the Attorney General kept focus on victim’s rights 
and prosecuted lead perpetrators of  the violence and repression that 
defined the civil conflict period. The most important case came in 2013, 
when the public prosecutor and the courts successfully convicted former 
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General and Head of  State, Efraín Ríos Montt, of  genocide charges 
(Gagne 2016).
By investigating and bringing to trial high-ranking military personnel for 
genocide, Claudia Paz y Paz set the precedent that the public prosecutor 
can be independent (El Mundo 2013). Many analysts state that the tenure 
of  Claudia Paz y Paz as the first truly independent public prosecutor, set 
the conditions for Thelma Aldana to advance in her role (Gagne 2016). 
In an interview in 2016, Claudia Paz y Paz reflected:
I think that the genocide trial and other important trials that were 
brought before the courts during my time as attorney general, were 
cases that have strengthened the Public Ministry as a judicial body. 
There are courageous officials, judges who have presented cases as 
important as the genocide case, and this strengthening permitted other 
cases to be presented that before were unthinkable (ibid.).
When these two groups joined forces – CICIG and the Attorney 
General’s office – it became possible to take corruption charges up to 
the highest level of  public office. Using modern investigative forensic 
techniques to unearth paper trails and phone recordings, and then 
hosting a press conference to make this evidence public, the Attorney 
General and CICIG provided proof  of  the full extent of  institutional 
and political corruption for the first time.
4 Urban youth-led anti-corruption mobilisation
The exposure of  the full extent and reach of  corruption led by the 
CICIG and the Attorney General struck a chord with a section of  
youth. Gabriel Wer, who along with three of  his friends initiated the 
2015 protests by posting an invitation on Facebook to demonstrate 
in the Central Plaza, recalls that neither he nor his friends had 
ever attended a social protest before, but they were outraged at the 
corruption of  the political elite and galvanised into action. In order to 
get people to attend, they had to explain that it was a peaceful protest, 
non-partisan and non-ideological, demanding the resignation of  the 
vice-president and then of  the president (Wer 2016). Youth indignation 
and mobilisation ran counter to decades of  political apathy on the 
part of  the urban middle classes (Luhnow 2015). Furthermore, these 
were young people who came from a social milieu where the control 
of  politics, education, the judiciary, and banking had long been in the 
hands of  their elders (Aitkenhead Castillo 2017). For them to erupt 
in rage and galvanise large numbers of  urban youth to protest what 
was effectively a corrupted ‘status quo’ was seen as radical by both the 
national and international press.
The testimonies of  young people who mobilised reflect the generational 
change between their parents who lived through the political violence 
and repressive years, and themselves, who grew up after the Peace 
Accords were signed, wanted to become civically active, but have never 
seen or experienced a civic protest. Donald Urizar, one of  the leaders of  
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the civic movement in Quetzaltenango explains it in this way: ‘For our 
parents – who lived the armed conflict – we were creating social unrest 
and were risking being repressed by authorities. For the young people, 
attending the peaceful protests was a chance to hang out in the park and 
take selfies’. However, the level of  awareness changed little by little with 
every Saturday, through the publication of  open letters and continued 
communication through social media; the participating youth became 
more engaged with the mobilisation and the demands (Urizar 2016: 67).
On Saturday 25 April 2015, over 35,000 people attended the first 
of  these anti-corruption protests in Guatemala City’s Central Plaza. 
Gabriel and his group made no claim of  leadership. The crowd 
whooped and shouted, whistled and drummed. They held up signs 
denouncing corruption and demanding the resignation of  the 
vice-president. Soon, news of  the protests in the capital reached 
Guatemala’s other cities, resulting in follow-on protests in the central 
plazas of  five other cities. The novelty of  youth-led protests, on the 
heels of  several decades of  youth apathy, was such that TV channels 
clamoured to transmit the action live. The extensive coverage no doubt 
contributed to an ever-growing number of  people joining the protests.
The civic protests continued for over 20 Saturdays in Guatemala’s main 
urban plazas, each time beginning at three in the afternoon. As reported 
in the press, the protests that followed on from that initial gathering 
evolved into something multigenerational, and brought to the streets 
people from a range of  class, ethnic, and socioeconomic backgrounds. 
A young activist from Quetzaltenango – the second largest urban centre 
in Guatemala – recalls that the civic protest was the next step from 
cyber-activism:
We forced ourselves to go out to the streets. However, we had never 
done it before, we had no idea about the logistics involved in having 
thousands of  people walking together on the streets, the permits 
from authorities we needed to file, the logistics to close the traffic, the 
sound system, etc. (Urizar 2016: 67).
The 2015 protests became a civic celebration, sparked initially by young 
people’s anger and indignation over government corruption.
Indigenous and rural peasant movements, that is, those civic groups 
with roots in the early years of  the Guatemalan civil conflict, were 
absent from the first wave of  urban protests. However, by the third 
Saturday, these groups began to join in. Nora Chamalé, a national 
indigenous rights leader, explained the early reticence to join the 
youth-led urban anti-corruption protests: ‘We wanted the youth and the 
newly mobilised to understand that this corruption isn’t new, and this 
corruption is the same that led to many of  the injustices and abuses that 
peasants and indigenous people mobilise against’ (Chamalé 2016: 129). 
It was Daniel Pascual, she recalled, a prominent figure in the indigenous 
rights movement, who convinced his peers that this outburst of  urban, 
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middle-class protest represented something new and galvanising. The 
Saturday protests marked the beginning of  a shift in awareness among 
those with positions of  greater privilege that the Guatemalan state 
was corrupt, and that through joining forces with the historic factions 
of  rural indigenous and peasants’ movements, they could become a 
national force for change.
After more than ten Saturdays of  civic protests in urban plazas 
throughout Guatemala, the vice-president resigned but the president 
remained in power, refusing to step down. There began to be calls for 
a national strike, a tactic that represented a return to strategies of  past 
indigenous and peasant movements (Gutiérrez 2015). This call for a 
national strike gathered support among the Facebook and Twitter-
following urban youth. Furthermore, the idea spread to small businesses 
within the food industry, which employs mostly young people, and then 
beyond. The date, 27 August 2015, was declared.
On that day, over 250,000 people gathered in Guatemala City’s Central 
Plaza, while tens of  thousands more mobilised in urban plazas in 
Guatemala’s smaller cities. By the time of  the national strike, there 
were estimates that over 1 million Guatemalans had participated in 
the anti-corruption protests. The initial wave of  activism had grown 
to include not only the traditional ‘protest’ sector within the national 
universities, but also youth from private universities, religious institutions, 
indigenous and peasant movements, and ordinary citizens who had 
never once before raised their voice in protest (Ixchíu 2016). The strike 
paralysed the capital and many other cities for at least 12 hours.
Surveys conducted after the fact suggested that the civic mobilisations 
were not driven by a single political ideology, but that participants 
ranged from across the political spectrum (Mendoza 2017). These 
mobilisations marked a tectonic shift in Guatemalan public life, as one 
young activist explained, given the country’s long established ‘culture of  
fear and silence’ which – since the days of  Spanish colonisation – ‘have 
been part of  structural social relations in Guatemala’ (Ixchíu 2016: 31).
5 The benefits and limitations of social media and cyber-activism
As we saw in the previous section, the anti-corruption mobilisations 
were first catalysed via social media channels, namely Facebook and 
Twitter. As with youth-led political mobilisations in other corners of  the 
world, the communication tools offered by social media enabled the viral 
recruitment of  others to their anti-corruption cause. With the help of  
sharp imagery and a clever hashtag, #RenunciaYa captured attention and 
quickly snowballed so that within a few hours of  the initial call for protest, 
some 10,000 people had confirmed their participation (Wer 2016).
The use of  social media continued to be of  critical importance in 
the build-up to the national strike on 27 August. Through social 
media campaigns, the #RenunciaYa group encouraged small businesses 
to declare allegiance to the anti-corruption cause. Bolstered by 
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15 additional organisations that took on formal roles as ‘co-organisers’, 
the campaign grew in strength to the point that it was able to generate a 
citizen boycott of  those food, retail, and service businesses that refused 
to join the strike. With pressure building, several large international food 
chains switched allegiance and announced their support of  the national 
strike on 26 August. By the morning of  27 August, the organised private 
sector was left with no option but to announce its support (Solís 2016).
A few days after the strike, Parliament voted to remove the president’s 
immunity. This removal and the social pressure resulted in the president 
announcing his resignation. He was immediately taken into custody 
to face accusations of  leading a corruption ring that operated via the 
government customs agency. His resignation was widely celebrated 
and the Saturday mobilisations came to an immediate halt. While 
social media had enabled the rapid spread of  the Saturday protests and 
engendered citizen outrage, the youth-led anti-corruption movement 
had no staying power. In the aftermath of  the resignations, the 
protesters celebrated a job well done. However, as analysts have argued 
since, the newly mobilised urban youth did not have any in-depth 
knowledge of  the historical precedent of  state capture by paralegal 
crime. Given the depoliticisation of  the Guatemalan population at large 
following so many years of  political repression and state-sanctioned 
violence, this new wave of  protesters did not have the necessary 
experience or contextual understanding to identify the corrupt practices 
of  the president and vice-president as part of  a larger system, and 
saw the resignations as ‘mission accomplished’ (Cuevas-Molina 2016; 
Morales 2016).
6 The beginning of a movement aware of history and continuous 
civic action
Despite the abrupt conclusion of  the Saturday protests, some elements 
of  the urban youth anti-corruption movement remained committed 
to ongoing civic action. They have since come to understand that real 
change will require greater participation in political parties, through 
campaigns for elected representatives that uphold the anti-corruption 
mission, and through sustained calls for government accountability 
(DiálogosGT 2017). Subsequently, the group #RenunciaYa, who created 
the original Facebook event transformed themselves into #JusticiaYa, 
now an active organisation of  urban youth with affiliates in urban 
centres beyond the capital.
In light of  having learned the limitations of  targeting individually 
corrupt actors, versus seeking change at a systemic level, these 
organisations have since implemented a dynamic learning exchange 
with historical indigenous and peasant movements that they call 
‘weaving the future’. This ‘weaving the future’ involves pulling together 
the threads of  past civic protest together with contemporary calls for 
judicial, legislative, and political reforms. Gabriel Wer, now a leader of  
#JusticiaYa explains:
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In the year 2015, we concentrated our demands on the resignation 
of  the president and vice-president. When the calls to continue the 
pressure further to implement structural reform came about, we 
lost it – we did not have enough information and knowledge to act 
strategically (Morales 2016).
Through ‘weaving the future’ they have greater knowledge on 
the historical roots of  the causes of  corruption and the structural 
reforms that will be required to unpick and dismantle the rot within 
state institutions (Morales 2016). For example, in Quetzaltenango, 
Guatemala’s second city, what began as #RenunciaYa has now become a 
formal civil society organisation that monitors public budgets and holds 
to account the municipal authorities (Urizar 2016). The organisation 
continues using social media as a mobilising strategy: ‘By using social 
media in an adequate manner, we have been able to inform and make 
other young people aware, who are now very active in supporting civil 
society organisations’ (ibid.: 73).
One key aspect of  ‘weaving the future’ has been the awareness-raising 
of  urban, middle-class youth to the historic demands of  indigenous and 
peasants’ rights movements. During the civic protests, particularly in urban 
areas beyond the capital, indigenous youth played a crucial role. Whereas 
the urban, middle-class youth who initiated #RenunciaYa constituted a newly 
politicised population, indigenous youth such as student leader Lucia Ixchíu 
who was 24 during the 2015 protests, represented a multigenerational 
cohort of  social mobilisation and political struggle (Ixchíu 2016: 32). 
Indigenous rights leaders, who within their own communities have passed 
down knowledge of  past repression, violence, and strategic mechanisms for 
claiming rights, now talk of  urban youth as an ‘awakened’ group who can 
contribute to their ‘historical struggle’ (Silva 2016: 48).
7 Reappearance of traditional divides within the youth movement
The anti-corruption crusade led by the public prosecutor together with 
CICIG had almost complete support from Guatemalan society during 
2015 and 2016. However, as the investigation advanced and new cases 
were brought to courts, the indicted went beyond corrupt politicians 
to include bankers, private corporations, and family members of  the 
powerful traditional economic elite. One case involved the brother 
and son of  newly elected president Jimmy Morales. These recent cases 
revealed the extent to which economic and political elites had benefited 
from their co-optation of  the structures of  the Guatemalan state. Not 
surprisingly, these revelations of  the systemic and structural nature of  
corruption in Guatemala created rifts among those who had originally 
supported the anti-corruption agenda. In response to the spread of  
allegations, powerful industrial elites initiated a campaign accusing 
CICIG and the public prosecutor of  a leftist political agenda against 
their affiliates (Garcia and Pellecer 2018).
Among the urban youth that had first mobilised as part of  the 2015 
wave of  protests, new groups and movements emerged that began to use 
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the judiciary and courts to hold politicians and government authorities 
to account. At the same time, other factions of  politically mobilised 
young people splintered off from the original cause. For example, the 
#GuatemalaInmortal movement organised to protect ‘life, liberty and 
private property’, directly challenging what they perceived of  as a 
‘leftist’ takeover of  the 2015 civic protests (Urrutia 2017). Since 2017, 
#GuatemalaInmortal has used social media to protest against the CICIG 
Commissioner and the constitutional reforms that aimed to strengthen 
the judiciary, as well as voicing their support of  the current president (in 
spite of  emerging evidence of  illicit funding of  his electoral campaign) 
(E&N 2017). Other factions of  the mobilised youth that first gained 
ground in the 2015 protests include groups that support conservative 
and religious agendas (e.g. anti-abortion, anti-LGBT rights, anti-gender 
rights). On the left, these splits led to the creation of  two new political 
parties: Movimiento Semilla, identified as centre-left, and Movimiento 
para Liberación de los Pueblos, with a left-leaning, progressive, 
and indigenous rights agenda. What began as an urban youth-led 
anti-corruption movement in 2015 has now since split along divergent 
ideological lines (conservative, left, right, religious).
8 Conclusions
This case of  the 2015 youth-led anti-corruption movement in 
Guatemala shows what has become possible in terms of  peaceful 
political protests for a generation not directly touched by the violence 
and repression of  the country’s 30-plus years of  civil conflict. It is clear 
that the reformulation of  an active citizenry, one with the genuine 
potential to hold political leaders to account, is a long-term process in 
a country scarred by war. The urban youth who initiated #RenunciaYa 
had no direct knowledge of  civic protest, nor were they connected in 
any direct way to the rural, indigenous movements that had formed 
the core of  rights-focused political mobilisation in the latter half  of  the 
twentieth century. Moreover, although the focus of  many reports about 
the Guatemalan anti-corruption movement has been on the urban 
youth that mobilised, it is also important to note that those professionals 
working in the Public Prosecutor’s Office, doing the groundwork of  
investigation, preparing the cases and defending the cases in court 
are also young – most of  them are less than 35 years old. This young 
generation of  public officials had a different ethos and motivation than 
the previous generations that grew up during the period of  political 
violence and conflict.
A closer reading of  the case shows that the mobilisation which 
was successful in leading to the resignations of  the president and 
vice-president was due to a fortunate alignment between protesters 
on the street (the youth) and key reformist institutions within the state 
(the public prosecutor and the CICIG), leading to pressure on the 
executive horizontally as well as vertically from below. This appears 
to be a variation of  the ‘sandwich strategy’ in which the building of  
pro-accountability coalitions is needed to effect change (Fox 2015).
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Further, although the collaboration between the new youth movement 
and the ‘older’ indigenous movements proved key to bringing about 
the national strike, as the protests matured the historic demands of  
indigenous and rural peasant movements (access to land, indigenous 
rights, and cultural identity) were not incorporated into the 
anti-corruption demands for government reform. Now, some of  the 
spin-off urban youth movements have learned from the limitations 
of  their original approach and are actively pursuing collaboration, 
exchanges, and alliances with long-standing indigenous and peasant 
groups. This suggests that while the social media strategy served to spark 
and steer the initial wave of  outrage, there is a longer process of  collective 
identity building, strategising, and ideological clarification that can only 
occur through sustained engagement and face-to-face learning exchanges.
The case also offers insights into the strengths and limitations of  
viral activism. While social media played a crucial role in the rapid 
mobilisation of  urban-based youth and to spread the news of  the 
protests across the country, it was insufficient to galvanise a common 
group identity or clear agenda for structural reforms. For genuine 
systemic change to occur, these newly mobilised young people will need 
to ‘weave the future’ together with the indigenous and peasant rights 
movements with longer histories of  protest and political action.
Notes
*  This issue of  the IDS Bulletin was prepared as part of  Action for 
Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA), an international research 
programme exploring social and political action in fragile, conflict, 
and violent settings. A4EA is a consortium led by IDS and funded 
with UK aid from the UK government. The views expressed do not 
necessarily reflect the official policies of  our funder.
1 Walter Flores, Director, Center for the Study of  Equity and 
Governance in Health Systems (CEGSS), Guatemala.
2 The Guatemalan conflict is amply documented in the literature. 
Some key references related to the arguments in this article are: 
Flores, Ruano and Funchal (2009), Grandin, Levenson-Estrada and 
Oglesby (2011), and Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico 
(CEH) (1999).
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